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Figure 1 Raphael, Transfiguration, 1519-1520. Oil on wood, 405 x 278. Vatican: Pinacoteca 
 
 
Masks of Dionysus 
 
In The birth of  tragedy, Nietzsche summarizes the concept of his essay by a 
comprehensive description of Raphael`s Transfiguration. The philosopher prizes the 
‘naïve’ Aeschylus, and compares him with the Urbinate painter: 
 
Raphael, himself one of those immortal ‘naive’ men, has presented in an 
allegorical painting that reduction of an illusion into an illusion, the 
fundamental process of the naive artist and Apollonian culture as well.  In Beat Wyss            The Schopenhauer-Galaxy 
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his Transfiguration the bottom half shows us, with the possessed boy, the 
despairing porters, the helplessly frightened disciples, the mirror image of 
the eternal primordial pain, the sole basis of the world. The ‘illusion’ here is 
the reflection of the eternal contradiction, of the father of things. Now, out of 
this illusion there rises up, like an ambrosial fragrance, a new world of 
illusion, like a vision, invisible to those trapped in the first scene—something 
illuminating and hovering in the purest painless ecstasy, a shining vision to 
contemplate with eyes wide open. Here we have before our eyes, in the 
highest symbolism of art, that Apollonian world of beauty and its 
foundation, the frightening wisdom of Silenus, and we understand, through 
intuition, their reciprocal necessity. But Apollo confronts us once again as the 
divine manifestation of the principii individuationis, the only thing through 
which the eternally attained goal of the primordial oneness, its redemption 
through illusion, takes place: he shows us, with awe-inspiring gestures, how 
the entire world of torment is necessary, so that through it the individual is 
pushed to the creation of the redemptive vision and then, absorbed in 
contemplation of that vision, sits quietly in his rowboat, tossing around in 
the middle of the ocean.1
 
 
It is not my purpose to correct Nietzsche from the standpoint of wise-guy art 
history, by denouncing the philosopher’s iconographic ignorance. Indeed, the 
double action in the picture represents nothing else than a correct reading of the 
Gospel: Raphael depicts the transfiguration of Christ on the mountain of Tabor, 
followed the healing of the moonstruck boy according to Matthew 17 and Luke 9. 
But the modernist view, connoting pictures by a subjective hermeneutics, has 
unlearned reading religious imagery as a visual commentary to the Bible in a strictly 
literal way. 
  Let us be thankful, for Nietzsche himself was as ‘naïve’ as Raphael and 
Aeschylus. His productive misreading allows the unhindered display of a thesis 
whose virulence determines the general perception of art for a century. As already 
mentioned, the description of the Raphaelian picture records the plot in the The birth 
of tragedy; likewise, the ‘schwankende Kahn’ reports Schopenhauer’s leitmotiv, the 
relation between ‘will’ and ‘idea’:  
 
Just as a sailor sits in a boat trusting to his frail barque in a stormy sea, 
unbounded in every direction, rising and falling with the howling 
mountainous waves; so in the midst of a world of sorrows the individual 
man sits quietly, supported by and trusting to the principium individuationis, 
or the way in which the individual knows things as phenomena. 2
 
 
Nietzsche matches Schopenhauer’s ‘world as idea’ with the figure of Apollo. Christ 
on the mountain of Tabor in Raphael’s painting is an Apollinian vision: a glowing 
body of light, invented by our faith so that it may guide as a lodestar above of our 
 
1Friedrich Nietzsche: The birth of tragedy, Out of the Spirit of Music (1872) translated by Ian Johnston of 
Vancouver Island University, Nanaimo, BC,  last revised December 2008, see 
http://records.viu.ca/~johnstoi/Nietzsche/tragedy_all.htm  
2 Arthur Schopenhauer: The world as will and idea, translated from the German by B.B. Haldane, and J.Kemp, 
London: Kegan, Trench, Trübner, seventh edition, n.d. (1910?) vol.I, p.455. By text archive, Canadian Library. Beat Wyss            The Schopenhauer-Galaxy 
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unsaved, sombre life. Its sparkle spreads beauty and confidence to that Dionysian 
vale of tears, which, according to Nietzsche, is displayed in the foreground below by 
the tumultuous scene around the moonstruck boy.  
  The polarity of will and idea, of ordinance and chaos, individuation and 
fusion, the Dionysisan and the Apollinian principle became a mental topos of 
Modernism. Sigmund Freud, self-proclaimed follower of Schopenhauer, puts the 
polarity four decades after Nietzsche into the psychoanalytical terms of the Id and 
the Ego. The Ego is that little self-conscious skipper who dares to sail through the 
howling drives, the ‘world as will’, following his vision of a reasonable scheme of 
life, the ‘world as idea’. Life takes place in this contest between consciousness and 
the unconscious.  
 
   
 
Figure 2  Arnold Böcklin, Self and Death, 1872. Oil on canvas, 75 x 61. Berlin: 
Nationalgalerie. 
 
Arnold Böcklin´s Self and Dead stems from 1872, the same year when 
Nietzsche´s first version of the The Birth of tragedy was published. This edition was 
too scarcely disseminated for it to have been noticed by the artist. But the thoughts 
in it were due: the pertinent key words of an epoch rise simultaneously in the minds 
of creative contemporaries. The artist depicts himself in the light moment of Beat Wyss            The Schopenhauer-Galaxy 
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listening at the violin playing Death as a source of his inspiration. Böcklin’s self 
portrait represents the artist as the Apollinian hero by wresting from the dark 
melody of primordial lust and pain the persistent art work. According to 
Schopenhauer, the desire to get lost partakes of the will. Sigmund Freud will call it 
the Nirvana principle, the state of highest abandon, that common ground of Eros and 
Thanatos. Inebriation, love making and sleeping represent the small deaths, 
foreshadowing the eternal return to the great one. All these small deaths include the 
tempting promise to which the artist actually listens from the fiddling Death: that 
the weak instants of fulfilled lust – always interrupted by longing, boredom, and 
pain – might be replaced by a definite dose of Nirvana. It is the same dangerous 
wisdom which Nietzsche’s Silenus once addressed to King Midas when he had 
hunted for the demon in order to force him to tell the truth about life:  
Suffering creature, born for a day, child of accident and toil, why are you 
forcing me to say what would give you the greatest pleasure not to hear? 
The very best thing for you is totally unreachable: not to have been born, 
not to exist, to be nothing. The second best thing for you, however, is this—
to die soon.3
This wisdom makes the Ego scared of itself, becoming aware of being seducible, 
veering between the plight of sticking to his proper Self and the lust of getting lost. 
The attentive traits in the artist’s self-portrait show individuation as a kind of 
suffering vigil.  
 
Böcklin’s Self with Dead represents the process of the principium 
individuationis in terms of Schopenhauer. The painter translates it by brush and 
colour on canvas, transforming the gloomy drive into artistic clarity. The work bears 
assurance that the quarrel between selfhood and the desire of abandon can be 
sustained in a moderated form: within an esthetics of dissonance. The Apollinian-
Dionysian conflict overcomes by artifice. The observer can indulge in the 
temptations of the Nirvana without getting really lost. The art lover is able to 
navigate safely through the esthetic temptations like Ulysses and his companions: to 
the one who can listen, the hands are bent, and to the others who are rowing, the 
ears are blocked by wax while they all are passing by the reef of the Sirens. The 
deadly sound is banished to artistic pleasure. Esthetic experience gives you, like 
dreaming or love making, a little death with the licence for repetition by the durable 
work, again and again, riskless and with a healing impact.  
 
How is knowledge about the unconscious possible? 
A methodical interjection 
 
At this point we have to call up methodical doubt. Can it be correct to compare the 
text of a philosopher with the work of an artist if both of them hadn’t noticed each 
other? Doing so, don’t we give way to editorializing arbitrariness? Indeed, this risk 
is given. Comparative analysis needs methodological reasoning. But on the other 
hand, is it just enough to evidence a manifest correspondence between a textual 
source and an artistic document? What is achieved by the proof, for instance, that 
Giorgio De Chirico, the painter, had really studied the philosophy of Arthur 
Schopenhauer? The mechanist model of humanties as a history of influences bears 
 
3 Nietzsche, Tragedy, by Johnston, see footnote 1. Beat Wyss            The Schopenhauer-Galaxy 
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almost tautological insights. It misconceives the actual process of creativity. 
Correspondent manifestations don’t grow according to a cause-and-effect-chain but 
according to autopoietic analogy. Neither does the painter illustrate a philosophical 
thought, nor does the philosopher need to be set on the right track by contemplating 
a piece of art. In systemic terms, the discourses of different disciplines develop 
autonomously. Occasional references of an artist to a philosopher’s text or, vice versa, 
the philosopher’s observation on a painting occur always in order to confirm a 
concept that one has already seized. Comparisons between art and philosophy only 
make sense if we look for the contemporariety of ideas. The fitting method is a 
comparative discourse analysis: it develops either epistemic forms of knowledge or 
the intuitive mentality of an epoch. Here, we concentrate on the latter. 
Mentality fits as a link between art, knowledge, and policy of a given epoch. 
The word itself is a product of Modernism. We talk naturally about ‘mentalities’; the 
term is a neo-latin creation, coming up around 1900 in English together with an 
esoteric taste, correspondent to that zeitgeist. It came down to earth, according to 
today’s understanding, by the researches of Annales historiography. A founding 
work of a history of mentalities was Les rois thaumaturges, published in 1924 by Marc 
Bloch, treating the magic healing power of the French kings.4
With ‘esthetic mentalities’, I understand in particular the unconsciously 
assumed ideas, observable in the artistic endeavour. My mental ground is the blind 
spot of my perception. It takes part in the collective unconscious that remains 
generally concealed among contemporaries. There lies the difference from 
iconology, that art historical method for deciphering the meaning of art works. As a 
rule, it deals with messages that were once manifestly addressed by artists and 
patrons to a circle of addressees. Iconology analyzes therefore an iconic content that 
has been known before the readability of the art work became blurred in the course 
of time. Therefore, the lack of understanding is caused by the historical and cultural 
distance that separate today’s observer from the old work of art. The deciphering 
claims to reconstruct a knowledge which once had existed. Research in mentalities, 
however, concerns an unrecognized knowledge by its historical agents. The full 
contour of a mentality emerges only by the temporal distance of the historian. 
Iconographical programme and mental context correlate like the manifest and the 
latent message of a dream according to Freud. An esthetic mentality performs the 
collective unconscious of a time. Signs, consciously positioned, rock on mental 
waves like anchored boats on an agitated sea. As vague is the treasure of mental 
topics, as unstable the manifest content of imaginary thinking. 
 Mediating between 
the esoteric origins and historiographic ossification of the term were the works of 
the anthropologist Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, and the vitalism of Henri Bergson.  
 
4 See Marc Bloch (1886-1944): The royal touch: sacred monarchy and scrofula in England and France (1924), London: 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973. Concerning historiography of mentalities see André Burguière: The Annales school, 
An intellectual history (2006), Cornell University Press 2008; Peter Burke: The French historical revolution, The Annales 
school, 1929-1989, Oxford: Polity Press, 1990; Lutz Raphael: Die Erben von Bloch und Febvre, Annales-
Geschichtsschreibung und nouvelle histoire in Frankreich 1945 – 1980, Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1994; Ulrich Raulff: Ein 
Historiker im 20. Jahrhundert: Marc Bloch, Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer, 1995; Carlos Antonio Aguirre Rojas: La escuela 
de los Annales, Ayer, hoy mañana,  Puerto Rico: Editorial ERA, 2004. Beat Wyss            The Schopenhauer-Galaxy 
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‘They don’t know that but they do it’: The Marxian dictum about the 
unconscious within economical acting5
The cognition plan becomes recognizable by its obsolence as a quasi 
archaeological excavation field. According to Foucault, the conditions of knowledge 
are subject to historical breaks. The endurance of an epistemic order follows an 
historical apriori. Foucault has been reluctant to be qualified as a follower of 
structuralism.  He denies its strict separation of synchrony and diachrony by 
applying an historical discourse analysis. Les mots et les choses develops a system of 
plateaus by epochs whose spaces of cognition become comparable. Those plans, 
though, seem to be static as they are breaking in each case suddenly at the end of an 
epoch. The agency for an epistemic change of an historical apriori remains 
unexplained:  
 has been translated by Michel Foucault into 
the ambit of epistemiology. In his preface to the German edition, he calls it 
‘empirical knowledge’, neglected by the conventional history of sciences. It is 
comparable with the conventional iconology that is used to reconstruct the manifest 
cognition of a given time. Foucault, instead, is interested in a ‘positive unconscious’ 
whose rules are never defined because they are naturally practised.  His archaeology 
of cognition describes taxonomically the spatial order by which an historical 
knowledge is constituted. An epistemic field becomes visible almost trivially by the 
spines along a book case of a library, by the positioning of show cases with stuffed 
animals in a museum of natural history or the hanging of pictures in an art 
collection. They follow an order, naturally evident to the contemporary observer. 
When it becomes altered, the new order becomes installed out of pragmatical 
reasons because the old order doesn’t match the habitual performance of a form of 
knowledge any more. When such interventions didn’t happen for decades or even 
centuries, the order of a library, a curiosity cabinet or an art collection looks 
completely unpractical, disorderly and bizarre.  
 
It seemed to me that it would not be prudent for the moment to force a 
solution. I felt uncapable, I admit, of offering the traditional explanations – 
spirit of the time, technological changes, influences of various kinds – 
struck me for the most parts being more magical than effective. In this 
book, then, I left the problem of causes to one side.6
 
  
This statement marks the difference from the history of mentalities which really 
tries to answer the question about the epistemic changes, to describe this ‘magic’ by 
which ideas become disseminated and formed beyond the consciousness of the 
historical agents who act it out without knowing it.  
Let us summarize: According to Foucault, the empiricity of ordering remains 
in the Unconscious, like the modality of how things become positioned in the space 
of knowledge by thinking. The unconscious, in the sense of mental history, is the 
functioning of habitual conceptions of thinking. I call them fuzzy thoughts: vague 
ideas, shipped by epistemic acting in all ambits of science and belief. The way that 
fuzzy thoughts act as fatal driving power of culture definitely has a kind of ‘magic’ 
 
5 Karl Marx: ‘Sie wissen das nicht, aber sie tun es’ in: Das Kapital, Kritik der politischen Ökonomie,  in: Marx und 
Engels, Werke, vol. 23, Berlin: Dietz, 1973, p. 88 
6 Michel Foucault: The order of things, An archaeology of the human sciences, Oxford: Routledge, 1989, p.XIIIf Beat Wyss            The Schopenhauer-Galaxy 
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of which Foucault speaks somehow disparagingly. Fuzzy thoughts represent the 
latent zones of culture where dull phantasies of empowerment, collective 
prejudgements and dimly objectives emerge.  
While the archaeology of knowledge speaks of epistemic breaks, 
taxonomically inscribable in spaces of cognition, the history of mentalities analyzes 
topical constants, persistent by longue durée as commonplaces and idiosyncrasies for 
a long time.7
The discovery of the unconscious is a specific achievement of modernist 
cognition. The history of mentalities as a history of unconscious action corresponds 
therefore with a modernist conception of historiography. Relinquishing the res gestae 
of kings and of warriors, the sovereign subjects of dominance, it turnes towards the 
events of everyday life. Thus, a coincidence between archaeology of knowledge and 
mental history can be defined negatively. Both are not focussing on acts of free will, 
free cognition, and deliberate deeds. 
 Foucault opposed a history of ideas. This brief interjection is not a 
place to reason about the critique whether an archaeology of knowledge is possible 
by blanking out the imaginary of ideas, whether a description of epistemic spaces 
would become completely abstract without considering the topical narrative of 
thinking. It may suffice to ask the question. I content myself with the observation 
that the archaeology of knowledge and history of mentalities operate by 
methodically quite similar scientific interests. The Foucault position asserted itself 
interdisciplarily while the approach of the Annales is confined, more or less, to 
historiography and cultural studies. Both ways are bridged by the habitus theory of 
Pierre Bourdieu whose sociological method is influenced by Emile Durkheim. His 
school, in turn, had an impact on both Foucault and the Annales.  
 
Post idealist German pessimism 
 
As prominently the unconscious is discussed by French post structuralism, as 
fragmentarily perceived is the correspondent German tradition: that rhizome of 
thoughts which I call the Schopenhauer Galaxy, whose shape is given by the 
lodestars Richard Wagner, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Sigmund Freud. Schopenhauer 
created his nihilistic panorama of The world as will and idea as a general counterdraft 
to the Hegelian philosophy of reason. In 1820, the young private lecturer rivaled 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel`s teaching at the University of Berlin by scheduling 
his lectures at the same hour. Schopenhauer lost the philosophical duel against the 
last great representative of German idealism: the auditorium stuck with Hegel. The 
Restauration era might have warmed towards the optimist thought of a progressing 
Weltgeist that leads humankind on its course to self conscious liberty. Only after the 
mid-nineteenth century, Schopenhauer`s critique of consciousness came across 
within the climate of scientific positivism while the enlightened trust in the power 
of the free subject began to fade.  
According to Schopenhauer, humankind resembles hedgehogs by trying to 
huddle against each other until they prick and separate again: a dancing ceremony 
of attraction and repulsion which recurs ceaselessly anew. Happiness, for which the 
will of life is striving, can only be defined negatively: as avoidance of deficit and 
pain. Fundamentally, the manifestation of will is to want something to cease. One 
 
7 See Beat Wyss: Der Wille zur Kunst, Zur ästhetischen Mentalität der Moderne, Cologne: DuMont, 1996 Beat Wyss            The Schopenhauer-Galaxy 
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wants absence of ache and urge. Lust is nothing other than the aversion to a lack 
that has to be plugged. But this pain of lust grows again after each act of satisfaction 
like the heads of Hydra, proliferating by getting decapitated. 
The introduction of The world as will and idea compares the effect that The 
critique of pure reason by Immanuel Kant produces with the operation of an eye 
cataract upon a blind man: ‘the aim of my own work may be described by saying 
that I have sought to put into the hands of those upon whom that operation has 
been successfully performed a pair of spectacles’8
By describing life as a realm of fooling representations, Schopenhauer takes 
up a parable out of the Hindoo Veda and the Puranas:  
  
 
It is Maya, the veil of deception, which blinds the eyes of mortals, and 
makes them behold a world of which they cannot say either that it is or that 
it is not: for it is like a dream ; it is like the sunshine on the sand which the 
traveller takes from afar for water, or the stray piece of rope he mistakes for 
a snake.9
 
  
In his Opus magnum, Schopenhauer lets appear an earth-spirit who shows the reader 
the great individuals, the highlights and catastrophes of world history: the theater of 
will. History is nothing else but a nightmare in which dreaming humankind tosses 
and turns. The real pointlessness of its proceeding mirrors the essence of the will in-
itself, whose forces are based beyond the chain of cause-and-effect. Much as the 
pure will is the source of all events and appearances, as much is ‘its self-knowledge 
and its assertion or denial (…) the only event in-itself.’10
  The second possibility, opened up by the Schopenhauer crossroad, is a life 
abnegating the will, being thereby a performance by which humans differ from all 
creatures. We are able to abdicate the world with stoical serenity and with that 
philsosophical insight ‘we become, as it were, freed from ourselves.’
 Nietzsche objected to this 
stoical crossroad. He claimed, instead, for the ‘Ja-Sagen’, the Will to Power, thus that 
slogan which the army of the Avant Garde by the majority will follow.  
11
 
 Having 
danced through the agitated night of life, its vestiges lay ahead of the abnegating 
one:  
He now looks back smiling and at rest on the delusions of this world, 
which once were able to move and agonise his spirit also, but which now 
stand before him as utterly indifferent to him, as the chess-men when the 
game is ended, or as, in the morning, the cast-off masquerading dress 
which worried and disquieted us in a night in Carnival.12
 
 
This metaphor makes an advance on the pictural imaginations of James Ensor 
where disrobed masks of bygone fancy dress parties lie about, almost too glaringly 
illuminated by the paleness of dawn. 
A modern way to exercise the denial of will is a life for art`s sake. Displaced 
 
8Schopenhauer I, see footnote 2,  p.XIf 
9 Schopenhauer I, see footnote 2, p.9  
10 Schopenhauer I, see footnote 2, p.238 
11 Schopenhauer I, see footnote 2, S.504 
12 Schopenhauer I, see footnote 2, p.505 Beat Wyss            The Schopenhauer-Galaxy 
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into the esthetic state of ‘pure, will-less knowing’, of ‘unbroken blissful peace’13 by 
the active process of creating, but also by passive contemplation,  the artist’s and the 
observer’s minds fuse with the ideal, perceived by the art work. ‘The artist lets us 
see the world through his eyes.’14 Cézanne will say it even more pointedly: ‘In 
painting we see all that mankind ever has seen. We all are the same human being.’15
  Particular subjects dissolve by esthetic experience into a single 
transcendental World-Ego of perception. Within artistic experience, affirmation and 
denial of will are both potentially included: the affirmation of will by enjoying the 
sensual pleasure in art, the denial by renunciation to transform the sensually 
experienced will by art into ordinary life. Schopenhauer calls Raphael the painter of 
‘that perfect calm of the spirit, that deep rest, that inviolable confidence and 
serenity’ by which the will is vanished.
  
16
 
 Nietzsche was probably inspired by this 
observation, interpreting Raphael`s Transfiguration as an allegory of Apollinian 
taming of the Dionysian drive. 
Suprematist nothingness 
 
Due to ordinary philosophical limitation, Schopenhauer illustrates his thoughts by 
using examples out of the great past in art history, misconceiving therefore his 
contemporariness that unconsciously connects his work with the art of his own time 
and that of the future. Kasimir Malevich is probably Schopenhauer’s most 
consequent follower. His Suprematist theory fuses the Russian tradition of religious 
mysticism and Peter Ouspensky’s occultist natural philosophy almost directly with 
Schopenhauer’s doctrine of abnegation, on its part influenced by Buddhism. 
Malevich’s writings out of the 1920’s, published posthumously in German in 1962 
under the title Die gegenstandslose Welt, sound at length like paraphrases of an 
intense reading of Schopenhauer. The philosophical model becomes obvious in the 
most famous passage, often quoted as the Suprematist manifesto:  
 
Therefore, consciousness, attached to realism, remains in a sleepy state of 
ideas and assumptions.  Humankind rushes sleepingly through the spaces 
of time, produced by the imaginations of its consciousness.  
 
Economy, reason, judgement, meaning, logic, science: all this are means to 
seek for God, or for the future, one seeks the perfect being, one seeks the 
truth. But by the awakening, it will turn out that we find ourselves in the 
nonrepresentional truth. The world as idea, as reason, as will will 
disappear like a fog. 
 
Summing up, I would like to assert: To all actions, caused by human 
wisdom, there is to oppose the principle of the nonrepresentational, a 
principle that is free from any attempt to strive for something objective in 
the future or in God, to put any real hope in them.   
 
13 Schopenhauer I, see footnote 2, p.323 
14 Schopenhauer I, see footnote 2, S.252 
15 Paul Cézanne: Über die Kunst, Gespräche mit Gasquet, Briefe, edited by Walter Hess, Mittenwald: Mäander, 1980, 
p.32. Translated by B.W. 
16 Schopenhauer II, p.507.  Beat Wyss            The Schopenhauer-Galaxy 
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In the lofty space of cosmic feasts, I establish the white world of the 
Suprematist Nonrepresentational as a manifestation of uncaged 
Nothingness!17
 
 
 
Figure 3 Casimir Malevich: Suprematism (with eight rectangles), 1915. Oil on canvas, 57,5 x 
48,5. Amsterdam: Stedeldijk Museum. 
 
The closing sentences out of Malevich’s Gegenstandslose Welt  join in the closing 
sentences of Schopenhauer’s World as will and idea which ends up a thousand pages 
of philosophical scepticism and asceticsism as follows: 
 
 No will: no idea, no world.  
 
Before us there is certainly only nothingness. But that which resists this 
passing into nothing, our nature, is indeed just the will to live, which we 
ourselves are as it is our world. That we abhor annihilation so greatly, is 
simply another expression of the fact that we so strenuously will life, and are 
nothing but this will, and know nothing besides it. 
(…) 
Rather do we freely acknowledge that what remains after the entire abolition 
of will is for all those who are still full of will certainly nothing; but, 
conversely, to those in whom the will has turned and has denied itself, this 
our world, which is so real, with all its suns and milky-ways is nothing.18
 
17 Kasimir Malewitsch: Suprematismus – die gegenstandslose Welt, edited by Werner Haftmann, translated into 
German by Hans von Riesen, Cologne: DuMont, 1962, pp.193-194. Translated into English by B.W.  
 
18 Schopenhauer I, see footnote 2, p.530 Beat Wyss            The Schopenhauer-Galaxy 
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Malevitch’s curious phrase ‘Schlaf der Vorstellungen’ (‘sleepy state of ideas and 
assumptions’)  must have been inspired by Schopenhauer whose introduction treats 
the relation of vigil and dreaming. Both states of mind belong to the world as idea. 
They differ only gradually to the extent that the representations are ordered 
according to the law of cause and effect:  
 
Life and dreams are leaves of the same book. The systematic reading of this 
book is real life, but when the reading hours (that is, the day) are over, we 
often continue idly to turn over the leaves, and read a page here and there 
without method or connection: often one we have read before, sometimes 
one that is new to us, but always in the same book.19
 
 
The scatterbrained scrolling of a book represents the brief and airy dream within the 
long and heavy dream which is life. Corresponding to this metaphor, Malevitch 
understands the objective world of idea generated by dormancy. Suprematism 
claims to wake up dreaming humankind into unleashed nothingness. 
 
 
The Apocalypse and the twilight of the gods 
 
Schopenhauer’s philosophy implies an inspiration theory of Modernism which 
comprehends itself as a creation out of the unconscious. Therewith, the stage opens 
up for the recurrence of the suppressed, for the evil, and that already mentioned lust 
for abandonment. Freud’s Nirvana principle explains the intrinsic vincinity between 
Modernist esthetics and iconoclasm. Every modernist work of art includes, more or 
less, a leaning towards self effacement, the narcissist rage about its own 
arbitrariness. Honoré Balzac created a literary figure of artistic self destruction in 
with master Frenhofer in Le chef d´oeuvre inconnu. But the most monumental art 
work, celebrating self-abandonment, isn’t one of fine art, nor of literature, but a 
musical one: Der Ring des Nibelungen by Richard Wagner, one of the most faithful 
and deliberate followers of The world as will and idea. There are the Apollinian gods 
like Wotan, die Walkyries, Siegfried, and Hagen, driven by ambition for honour and 
property, pursuing a clear goal, becoming guilty by their actions. Wotan is able to 
construct Walhalla Castle only by investing the raped gold treasure from the Rhine 
ground and by bartering away his own sister Freia. In the end they all fail in their 
conflicting goals. Triumphing are Erda, Loge, and the Rhine Daughters: Woglinde, 
Wellgunde, Flosshilde: Dionysian gods and demons, embodiments of blind will and 
unintentional being. Only temporarily bereft and tamed, they get their satisfaction 
in the Twilight of the gods when the unchained elements of water and fire annihilate 
Wallhalla Castle, the symbol of intentional striving. 
Thus, Loge comforts the Rhine Daughters for the loss of the Rhine Gold 
prophesizing already at the beginning of the narrative the end of the gods: 
 
They hasten to their end, 
Though they think themselves strong and enduring. 
 
19 Schopenhauer I, see footnote 2, p.22 Beat Wyss            The Schopenhauer-Galaxy 
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I am almost ashamed to share their doings; 
My fancy lures me to transform myself 
Back into flickering flames. 
To burn them who once tamed me, 
Rather than foolishly end with the blind, 
Even though they be the most godlike gods, 
Does not seem stupid to me. 
I’ll think it over: who knows what I will do?20
 
 
No one knows it. Loge is even unable to know it because he has no Ego, no goal, as 
he represents only a mask of the willing will, which objectifies itself, according to 
Schopenhauer, and rushes ahead like a cascade, a volcanic flow, or a burning comet 
out of ice.  
Wagner, the composer and bandmaster, wanted to follow Loge’s path when 
he originally planned to burn the libretto and the festival hall of Bayreuth after the 
execution of the Ring so that his work may ‘hasten to its end’ like the Wallhalla 
gods. Fortunately there were 
economic objections, moderating a 
factual transgression of the 
Götterdämmerung into nothingness. 
The message of Wagner’s work 
remains: Loge of the Rhine Gold 
can be understood as the avenging 
angel of Modernism. His 
prophecy glowed out in the 
Ragnarök above the Geman cities 
when a fascistically blinded 
leadership, despite of an already 
lost war, still kept forcing their 
soldiers and civilians, by 
hundreds of thousands, to endure 
extermination. Hitler acted as 
Siegfried who triumphs morally 
by his death over Hagen and his 
companions who, treacherously, 
had stabbed him in the back.  
Wagner’s Loge is still alive 
as a personification of terror, as 
castigating preacher of a returm 
into a realm beyond this technical 
civilisation of the West. The fire 
demon patronizes gnostic 
fundamentalism whose doctrines 
flare up in several political shades. 
 
20Richard Wagner: Der Ring des Nibelungen, Rhine Gold, end of the fourth scene. Quoted by the booklet, edited by 
Anne Schneider, with full libretti enclosed, in German, French, and English, p.147. Recording location: Vienna, 
Sofiensaal,  directed by Sir Georg Solti, September/October 1958, London: Decca, 1966, 1997 
Figure 4  Henri Fantin-Latour, Rhine Gold, 
1888. Oil on canvas, 116,5 x 79. Hamburg: 
Kunsthalle. 
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The Islamicist version, for instance, proves that the Mohammedian, the Jewish, and 
the Christian Gnosis are interrelated in a way which must irritate any zealot.  
 
Clinical drying-out 
 
To put it pathetically, Modernism has been the victim of its own concept of a will to 
power which ends in a cascade of self destruction. Thereby, a fatal dialectic develops 
within the dictatorships of the totalitarian regimes of the thrities. Its leaders claim to 
put the Modernist concept of will under the supremacy of politics. This demand 
became ideologically manifest by a reactionary resistance against the presumed 
danger of subversion by the unconscious. The movement of psychoanalysis had to 
retreat into Anglo-Saxon exile. 
 
A strong will or an inner experience may be proved by one’s work, and not 
by chatty words. We all are actually much less interested in the so called will 
than in the skill.21
 
  
Therewith, Adolf Hitler inaugurated in June 1937 the exhibition Great German Art, 
parallel to the infamous Entartete Kunst which violently ended the artists’s will to 
power. Hitler struck the vital ambition of the avant-garde. It wasn’t just a question 
of taste or style, it was the question of leadership. Modernist art had to give up its 
Messianism. The totalitarian state castrated the mission of art. The result was a 
range of artistic eunuchs whose function was to insulate an incited society in the 
state of war with innocuous kitsch. The totalitarian states of the 1930s usurped the 
promise for salvation instated by the avant-garde. In the German Reich, the artists - 
among them also some sympathetic to the Nazis - were forced into their external or 
inner exile. In the Soviet Union they were re-educated or exterminated. In Italy they 
were allowed to march with the Movimento. The aim to form society into a 
Gesamtkunstwerk should not be pushed through by art but by war policy. Many 
artists accepted even this turn, marching enthusedly in the 1914-1918 and the 1939-
1945 wars, that continuation of art by the weapon. By awaiting Ragnarök, the 
Apocalypse, and the twilight of the gods, the avant-garde is absolutely modern – 
insofar as Modernism constitutes itself as an inversion figure between promise and 
catastrophe. According to the prophecies, salvatory histories end in self 
abolishment, leading from historical time into eternal presence. In the form of 
esthetic experience, the nunc stans, the standing ‘Now!’ represents an anticipation of 
that prophecy. 
In spring 1945 Modernism woke up into the reality of its esthetic visions. By 
the end of the twilight of the gods, announced by the terrible banality of alarm 
sirens, and glowing out in firestorms above the cities, one had become tired of the 
Apocalypse. Postwar culture was no more eager to remind of the avant-garde`s 
salvatory expectations. The concept of the nunc stans underwent a transformation. 
The messianist dimension became cut off. The standing ‘Now!’, understood by the 
avant-garde as an eschatological state at the end of history, a gratification after the 
 
21 Translated by B.W. : ‘Ob jemand ein starkes Wollen hat oder ein inneres Erleben, das mag er durch sein Werk 
und nicht durch schwatzhafte Worte beweisen. Überhaupt interessiert uns alle viel weniger das sogenannte 
Wollen als das Können.’ Quoted by Hein 1992, p.270  Beat Wyss            The Schopenhauer-Galaxy 
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passed battles for the new`s sake, has been internalized by Postwar Modernism into 
a purist esthetic experience where notions like history and sociology were 
discredited to be milieu kitsch. In the art field, it was no more matter of collective 
salvation; instead, the drama of individual existence was at stake. 
After 1945, the unconscious lost its eminent meaning as a creative force in 
art. The refusal of psychically inspired theories emerged in the 1940s, when the 
United States took over the leading role in the system of Western art. Though the 
artists of Abstract Expressionism, like Mark Rothko and Jackson Pollock, did 
connect psychoanalyst experiences with the process of painting, cultural policy 
during the Cold War period rejected artistic methods whose exponents were 
suspected by the average American to be parlour communists. Given the friendship 
of André Breton with Leo Trotsky, the sympathies of Pablo Picasso with Josef Stalin, 
the McCarthy era must have sensed evildoing in Surrealism. Clement Greenberg’s 
formalist art theory can be understood as an initial, cultural roll back and 
containment of Old Europe`s dominance in the West.  
Starting already with Freud, the roaming will has been subjected to a 
psychoanalytic treatment. His symptoms became classified by a clinical scale of 
diseases between neurosis and psychosis. Therefore, the unconscious was an inept 
source of inspiration, the dream acted as the keeper of sleep. This clinical sobriety of 
psychoanalysis had been the reason why Freud rejected the surrealist art theory by 
Breton.  
In terms of post modern scepticism, it is only benefical when art, politics, 
and psychology unlocked from each other by autopoiesis. While existentialism faded 
out in the late 1950s, artists developed a lasting aversion against the sentimentalism 
of the ‘Psyche’. Its paradigm lives on in epigonal esotericism, recreational self-
awareness groups and New Age seminars for managers. 
 
Today the Schopenhauer galaxy shows an abandoned, displaced concept of avant-
garde containing a legacy of ideas which, retrospectively, sound just too German.  
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